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Abstract 
 
 
 
A number of theoretical lenses have been used to explain voluntary social and environmental 
reporting (SER) including legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and political economy theory. 
Recent theoretical work in the SER area suggests that the risk society theory presents an 
appropriate alternative theoretical framework. According to the risk society theoretical 
framework, risks have evolved from manageable, identifiable, insurable risks into 
imperceivable, uninsurable, high consequence risks. Many high consequence risks relate 
directly to corporate behaviour in the social, ethical and environmental domain, such as global 
warming. The risk society framework is also characterised by a general decline in trust in 
institutions and organisations. This paper contributes to the SER literature by providing 
empirical evidence to support a risk society theory of voluntary SER. By engaging directly 
with 24 corporate social responsibility managers within UK listed companies, we show that 
risk is driving them to produce voluntary SER. The paper provides empirical evidence that 
SER is emerging as a mechanism for reducing risk and anxiety, through the nurturing of trust 
relationships between companies and their stakeholders. The interviews reveal that building 
and maintaining trust in shareholder and stakeholder relationships is a primary motivation for 
SER and that SER is a means of engaging in dialogue with the company’s stakeholders. 
Companies are, from a risk society perspective, implementing SER as a risk management 
mechanism. We also find from the interviews that voluntary SER is motivated far more by its 
link with financial performance, through reputation enhancement, than by a genuine desire to 
enhance social justice. 
 
Keywords: Social and environmental reporting (SER); Risk society; Trust. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Social and environmental reporting (SER) has risen steadily since the early 1990s, increasing 
dramatically in the last three years, such that it has now entered the mainstream in 
industrialised countries (KPMG, 2005; O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005).1 In the literature, a 
number of theoretical lenses have been used to explain voluntary SER. These include 
legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and political economy theory. This paper contributes to 
the literature by presenting empirical evidence supporting the risk society theoretical 
framework as an appropriate lens for viewing and explaining voluntary SER. Further, the 
paper develops the risk society discourse as an explanation for voluntary SER, by focusing on 
the nurturing of trust as a means of reducing risk and anxiety among stakeholders. This paper 
builds on the theoretical framework explored in Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004a), suggesting 
that the risk society theory presents an appropriate theoretical framework for explaining the 
accelerating growth of SER in recent years. 
 
The risk society theory has emerged from the recent sociological literature and portrays a 
society faced with high consequence social, ethical and environmental (SEE) risks. Although 
originating from the work of Beck (1992; 1999)2, there are several competing and 
overlapping strands of the risk society theory emerging from different sociologists. This paper 
uses Giddens’ (1990) interpretation of the risk society theory, founded on the issue of trust 
(Lupton, 1999), to explain voluntary SER. He explained that society was becoming 
characterised increasingly by a decline in trust in institutions and organisations in general. It 
was this decline in trust which was exaggerating the level of risk in society. His suggestion 
                                                 
1 KPMG produced their first global survey of corporate environmental reporting in 1993. Although the latest 
survey (KPMG, 2005) considers all forms of ‘corporate responsibility’ reporting, SER remains the core of 
this reporting activity. 
2  This work was originally published in German as Risikogesellschaft: Auf Dem Weg in Eine Andere 
Moderne, by Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1986. 
for overcoming the inherent problems associated with perceived growth in societal risk was 
rebuilding trust as a means of risk reduction. It is in this sense that we interpret SER as a 
social and environmental mechanism for ‘risk management’, rebuilding trust and reducing 
anxiety at a societal level.3 As this increase in trust may be of benefit to the company, the 
SER process may be interpreted as another form of managerial capture (O’Dwyer, 2003). We 
also argue that in order for SER to act as an effective ‘risk management’ mechanism, it needs 
to adopt the characteristics of a genuinely dialogical process (Thomson and Bebbington, 
2004). We conducted a series of interviews with company employees selected from the 
FTSE100 to uncover the philosophical and theoretical motivation for voluntary SER. 
Specifically, we aimed to discover: 
(i) whether a risk society theoretical framework is an appropriate lens through which 
to view voluntary SER 
(ii) whether SER acts as a risk management mechanism for reducing risk and anxiety, 
nurturing trust and engaging with stakeholders, within a risk society theoretical 
framework. 
 
The paper attempts to shed light on whether the philosophy underlying SER arises from a 
genuine desire to enhance social justice or from business case arguments. The paper 
contributes to the existing SER literature by providing empirical evidence supporting an 
alternative theoretical lens through which to view SER. 
 
In the following section we review the risk society theory and consider some of the extant 
literature which uses this theoretical framework as a basis for discussing various aspects of 
social and environmental accountability (SEA) mechanisms. Section three outlines the 
                                                 
3 Note that by referring to a risk management tool, or strategy, we are not discussing risk in the scientific, 
internal control sense, but rather in the sociological sense (Lupton, 1999).  
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research methodology employed in this study. In section four we present the empirical 
findings and the paper concludes with a discussion in section five. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Prior Literature 
A Risk Society Theoretical Framework for Social and Environmental Reporting 
A number of theoretical lenses have been applied to explaining the development of voluntary 
SER.4 For example, legitimacy theory arises from the concept of a social contract being 
established between companies and society (Mathews, 1993). From this perspective, SER can 
be used by companies to attempt to legitimise their actions to society. The Tomorrow’s 
Company Report (RSA Inquiry, 1995) argued that there was a growing need for companies to 
maintain public confidence in the legitimacy of their operations in order to maintain their 
‘licence to operate’. As this ‘licence’ was provided by a broad range of stakeholders, it was 
important for companies to satisfy these stakeholders, as well as their shareholders. This 
perspective links in with the stakeholder theory of the firm. Legitimacy theory has been 
proffered as an explanation for why companies voluntarily disclose SER (Harte and Owen, 
1992; Deegan and Rankin, 1996). Indeed, Deegan and Rankin (1997) provided questionnaire 
evidence to support the theory that environmental disclosure practices are driven by 
companies’ attempts to legitimise their actions. 
 
Political economy theory is another theoretical paradigm that has been used to interpret 
voluntary SER. It derives from conflicting political, social and economic motivations within 
society (Gray, Owen and Adams, 1996) and suggests that SER is driven chiefly by socio-
political concerns. Another theoretical lens is that of a pure accountability motive for 
                                                 
4  The incentives and disincentives for corporate environmental disclosure, which apply equally well to SER, 
have been summarised in Solomon and Lewis (2002). 
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voluntary SER. This is based on the view that companies have a duty to discharge their 
accountability to society, not for financial gain, but for accountability purposes alone 
(Parkinson, 1993; Mathews, 1993; Gray et al, 1996). 
 
A markets motivation for SER has also been discussed in the literature, with the development 
of voluntary SER being attributed to a market demand for SER. In this paradigm, SER is 
produced in order to meet market demand from shareholders and other stakeholders (Macve 
and Carey, 1992). A strand of literature has attempted to reveal whether or not there is a 
significant demand for SER and whether or not SER is decision-useful. The overall consensus 
is weighted towards moderate decision-usefulness of SER.5  
 
More recently, the risk society theory has been presented as an alternative theoretical 
framework for SER. A handful of papers have arisen from the recent accounting literature 
which has used a risk society theoretical perspective as a means of interpreting SEA 
mechanisms. Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004a) explored the potential for a new theoretical 
framework based on the work of Beck and Giddens to explain the motivation for voluntary 
SER. The aim of the paper was to enhance critical analysis of corporate social disclosure and 
corporate social reporting. The paper proposed a hegemonic risk discourse as a motivating 
factor underlying voluntary SER. They focused on the work of the German sociologist, Beck, 
and specifically on the perceptions of risk as a framework in which to theorise CSR. Unerman 
and O’Dwyer (2004a) stressed that their theoretical contribution should complement rather 
than compete with emerging theory refinement. 
 
                                                 
5  See Solomon and Solomon, forthcoming, for a review of the literature in this area. 
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Beck’s (1992) risk society theory built upon the characteristics associated with the 
contemporary period of late modernity (Giddens, 1990; 1991), identifying risk as a primary 
factor shaping society, institutions, politics and individual life choices. He considered that 
society was now concerned with the distribution of risk whereas earlier generations were 
preoccupied with the distribution of wealth (Beck, 1992). One of his chief foci was the 
ecological dimension of the risk society, as he perceived that humans’ impact on the natural 
environment was affecting society at a deep level through the catastrophic risks faced from 
environmental degradation. Beck (1997) suggested that the way in which institutions were 
organised was not appropriate for the effective management of risk in a risk society. In the 
face of severe ecological problems, companies were perceived to fall into either, 
“... the role of villain and poisoner, or ... the role of the hero and helper and 
celebrate this publicly.... In the environmental issue, a post-modern, jaded, 
saturated, meaningless, and fatalistic pâté de foie gras culture creates a Herculean 
task for itself that acts as a stimulus everywhere and splits business into villains 
and Robin Hoods” (Beck, 1997, p.61). 
 
Beck (1997) described two constellations in the ecological conflict. One was characterised by 
confrontation, where polluter industries and affected groups confront each other. He explained 
that this only begins to change when a second constellation emerges where external interested 
parties get involved and the collaboration between polluters and victims which covers up the 
‘truth’ starts to disintegrate. This happens as industry recognises it is part of a risk society.  
 
The SEE risks associated with business activity have many characteristics (Beck, 1992; 
Giddens, 1991). Firstly, the risks in contemporary society differ from risks in previous eras as 
they are invisible and difficult to detect. Rather than ‘acts of God’ (plague, earthquakes, 
volcanic eruptions) risks now tend to be a result of human activity (global warming, nuclear 
accidents). These are the sort of risks which are particular to a modern risk society. Radiation 
or pollutants in farmed produce are not detectible to the nose or eye, only their effects are felt. 
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They also result from human intervention rather than from natural events. Another 
characteristic of risks in the situation of late modernity is that their consequences may be 
devastating for communities, the environment or biodiversity. They are, in Giddens’ (1991) 
terms, ‘high consequence’ risks. The emergence of high consequence risks, especially SEE 
risks, has been highlighted as a societal trend (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992). This proliferation 
of high consequence risks has posed problems for society and especially for companies, 
which have been held increasingly accountable for their creation.6 Beck (1997) focused 
specifically on ecologically-derived risks and their effects on society, institutions and politics. 
Awareness of high consequence risks, which represent dangers from which no one can be 
completely free, has now become part of individuals’ ‘umwelt’, the ‘cocoon’ of relevance and 
normalcy with which individuals surround themselves in order to place themselves in the 
world (Goffman, 1971).7 The growth of the media has also contributed greatly to the increase 
in awareness of risk, especially in the SEE area. Society is made acutely aware of events 
occurring in all four corners of the world and Giddens (1991) discussed the way in which the 
development of electronic media has contributed to the construction of a reflexive modernity. 
 
According to the risk society theory, there is a numbing effect on society of constantly listing 
dangers, which creates apathy (Giddens, 1990). People react to an overload of risk 
information by ‘switching off’. This apathy among members of society arises from a feeling 
of helplessness.  Although ‘one-off’ catastrophic events such as the Tsunami engender a 
public reaction, the existence of potential disasters arising from high consequence risks tends 
                                                 
6  The emergence of high consequence risks represents the dark side of modernity, being created by the 
rapidity of social and technological change. The types of risk falling into this category arise from the 
‘human control of natural and social worlds’ (Giddens, 1991, p.109). Specifically, Giddens (1990) sketched 
an array of high consequence risks including the growth of totalitarian power, the collapse of economic 
growth, nuclear conflict or large-scale warfare, and ecological decay or disaster. Clearly, SEE risks arising 
from corporate activity represent a significant ingredient in the materialisation of these high consequence 
risks. 
7  Giddens (1991) defined an individual’s protective cocoon as the mantle of trust that makes possible the 
sustaining of a viable umwelt. This trust incorporates an attempt by individuals to come to terms with high 
consequence risks. 
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to be ignored. This is probably because it is not ‘normal’ to worry constantly about high 
consequence risks such as nuclear war, as this would detract from coping with the practical 
aspects of everyday life. Another aspect of the risk society is that all social classes are 
affected by risk. Before the current period of late modernity, there was a division whereby the 
‘higher’ classes at the time could manage risk better than the ‘lower’ classes (infectious 
diseases, for example). Now, no social group is immune from the high consequence risks 
pervading the economy, such as the effects of nuclear accidents, or global warming. 
 
Accountability for the emergence of high consequence risks is difficult to pinpoint due to 
chains of inter-related responsibility. It is almost impossible in our society, which is 
characterised by complicated webs of inter-linked accountability, to attribute blame or 
responsibility to any one source. Scientific proof of linkage between cause and effect relating 
to risk analysis is being used as a means of dismissing risks. Beck (1992) also suggested that 
by insisting on scientific proof of causality, companies were able to escape accountability. 
Scientific risk analyses have allowed the buck to be passed back and forth, or simply 
concealed as, 
“By turning up the standard of scientific accuracy, the circle of recognised risks 
justifying action is minimized, and consequently, scientific license is implicitly 
granted for the multiplication of risks. To put it bluntly: insisting on the purity of 
the scientific analysis leads to the pollution and contamination of air, foodstuffs, 
water, soil, plants, animals and people. What results then is a covert coalition 
between strict scientific practice and the threats to life encouraged or tolerated by 
it” (Beck, 1992, p.62). 
 
Unerman and O’Dwyer’s (2004a) paper focused on a specific angle of the risk society theory, 
namely, the emergence and involvement of ‘experts’ in society to counter societal concerns 
regarding the impact of high consequence risks. Indeed, they developed their theory around 
the hegemonic position which these ‘experts’ managed to achieve in society. Such ‘experts’ 
include organisations and groups with mutually exclusive objectives, for example companies 
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and NGOs. Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004a) discussed the way in which experts build 
themselves up as experts and counter-experts, competing with each other to establish their 
preferred vision of reality. Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004a) focused on developing one 
specific aspect of the risk society theory in relation to CSR and CSD. They concentrated on 
Beck’s predictions that societal anxiety about high consequence SEE risks results in the 
creation of experts and counter-experts who attempt to allay fears, thereby manipulating 
societal anxiety to enforce their competing versions of reality. Beck refers to this process as 
‘contest for hegemony’ between experts and non-experts. A main aspect of the risk society 
theory is that society is losing trust in institutions. Indeed, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004a) 
argued that companies were using their hegemonic position to create and disseminate a myth8 
that their impact in the SEE area is benign and that societal anxiety about SEE risks is 
misplaced. They argued that the quest to disseminate this myth could lead to an overall 
mistrust of the whole business sector. It is possible that this has already happened. Companies 
are not only trying to put across a myth about their genuine interest and support of SEE issues 
but are struggling to dispel the high level of mistrust which has infiltrated society’s attitudes 
towards companies’ impact on the environment and society. Indeed, is it not because 
businesses perceive that society has now an inherent mistrust of their actions that companies 
are trying to forge links through SER and other forms of SEA? Is it not the case that SER is 
being used as a strategic tool to help businesses reduce risks created through increased 
societal anxiety? In this paper we argue that companies are motivated to provide voluntary 
SER in order to rebuild trust in their relationships with their stakeholders, starting from the 
point where society has lost faith in the genuine, authentic objectives of corporate activities in 
relation to SEE issues. The paper argues that SER is motivated more by attempts to tackle the 
                                                 
8  The ability for a hegemonic group to create, disseminate and sustain a ‘myth’ (in terms of a version of 
reality) is mooted in Gramsci (1971) and Freire (2004), to name but two. This idea is applied to companies’ 
attempts to disseminate a positive ‘myth’ about their impact on SEE issues in Spence (2004) and Solomon 
and Darby (2005). 
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overall mistrust inherent in society by building trust, than by putting across a hegemonic 
myth. Companies are hoping that they have retained adequate hegemonic power to be able to 
rebuild trust through their involvement in voluntary SER and other SEA mechanisms such as 
stakeholder engagement. 
 
The way in which Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004a) interpreted Beck’s and Giddens’ writings 
on modernity and the emergence of a risk society was from the perspective of a hegemonic 
risk discourse. Their paper focused on the ways in which companies abuse their hegemonic 
position in society by manipulating voluntary SER to their advantage. The current paper, 
while acknowledging that a certain level of hegemony arises in companies’ relationships with 
their stakeholders, focuses on the more positive aspects of this relationship. This paper 
focuses on one specific aspect of Giddens’ work, relating to the need to build and nurture trust 
in relationships, in order to counter the negative aspects of the risk society, especially societal 
anxiety about the potential impact of high consequence risks on the environment and society 
as a result of business activities. Despite the hegemonic position which many multinational 
and global companies find themselves in, they are engaging in  SER, as well as other SEA 
mechanisms, such as stakeholder engagement. The underlying philosophy driving this interest 
from businesses may be a genuine desire to enhance social justice, or simply the profit 
motive. This is also explored later in the paper in relation to empirical evidence. Although 
companies are in a hegemonic position, there appear to be more positive aspects attached to 
the motivation for SER, which involve building trust between companies and their 
stakeholders, as well as the possibility of an increasing desire to enhance social justice. 
 
In another paper, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004b) presented a theoretical argument for the 
necessity of NGO accountability, focusing on possible future negative outcomes, or risks, 
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arising from organizational activities. They framed their discussion in the risk society theory 
of Beck (1992; 1999). The paper considered the mechanisms of SEA. The authors stressed 
that in their view, the aim of SEA mechanisms was to enhance social justice. This contrasts 
with business case views that SEA is about enhancing shareholder wealth. The paper also 
emphasises that if SEA is rooted in economic self-interest (the business case view) then 
companies will only take notice of the most economically powerful stakeholders, which tend 
to be the institutional investors. 
 
O’Dwyer (2003) discussed corporate social and ethical reporting as a social accounting 
mechanism and explained that a lack of trust and suspicion was a feature of the relationship 
between companies and society. He considered that societal concerns could be neutralised 
through responsive postures, thereby reducing anxiety in a risk society perspective. This was 
indicative of a theoretical approach which encompasses SER as a risk management ‘tool’ as 
shown here. 
 
Georgakopoulos and Thomson (2005) used the risk society theory as a basis for discussing the 
potential for environmental accounting to contribute to greater accountability in the area of 
salmon farming. Their conclusions were that environmental accounting could dispel some of 
the fears in this industry by creating greater dialogue and restoring confidence in an industry 
bedecked with risks relating to contaminants in farmed salmon. We extend this work in the 
current paper by examining the extent to which SER, at a general level, is being motivated by 
a corporate desire to restore trust and reduce risk (or at least perceived risk) in society.   
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Trust and Risk: Restoring Trust as a Strategy for Reducing Anxiety and Risk in a Risk Society 
One of the salient characteristics of the risk society has been identified as a loss of trust. 
However, the interpretation of the role of trust in a risk society differs between the work of 
Beck and Giddens (Lupton, 1999). Whereas Beck considered that the monumental rise in 
societal risk in recent years has created a less trusting, less confident society, characterised by 
societal anxiety, Giddens’ view was somewhat different. Giddens (1990) considered that there 
is not necessarily a higher level of risk, but that society had become more reflexive. Society is 
now constantly questioning itself in relation to external influences such as business and 
government. Society is becoming more introspective and preoccupied with self-improvement. 
This increase in reflexivity has led to a decline in trust, which in turn has led society to be 
more anxious and more preoccupied with risks and their potential consequences. Again, 
reflexivity has been flagged up as a cornerstone of the risk society theory, but there are 
various interpretations of the term and its implications (see, for example, Giddens, 1990, 
p.36). 
 
From a Giddensian viewpoint, institutions face a crisis of trust, given the current trend in 
society to lose trust in institutions and organisations (Giddens, 1991). Further, sociologists 
have claimed that society is turning to counter-experts to replace the loss of confidence in 
traditional experts (Beck, 1992). Giddens (1990) explored the relationship between trust and 
risk and the relationship between confidence and trust, suggesting that trust should be 
understood specifically in relation to risk. He explained that,  
“risk largely replaces what was previously thought of as fortuna (fortune or fate) 
and becomes separated from cosmologies. Trust presupposes awareness of 
circumstances of risk, whereas confidence does not. Trust and confidence both 
refer to expectations which can be frustrated or cast down” (Giddens, 1990, pp. 
30-31). 
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He then set down his theory of risk and trust as follows. Trust is linked with contingency 
rather than with risk, and trust always carries the connotation of reliability in the face of 
contingent outcomes. Giddens stated that risk and trust intertwine and that trust generally 
serves to reduce or minimise the dangers to which particular types of activity are subject. In 
other words, building and establishing trust represents, in the Giddensian risk society 
framework, a form of risk management. Restoring trust and building confidence are ways of 
managing risk and therefore reducing societal anxiety. There are some circumstances in which 
patterns of risk are institutionalised, within surrounding frameworks of trust (stock market 
investment, for example). 
 
Giddens (1990) also considered that trust is reliant on a process of mutual self-disclosure, 
where the parties involved build trust by disclosing information to each other, 
“Relationships are ties based upon trust, where trust is not pre-given but worked 
upon, and where the work involved means a mutual process of self-disclosure.” 
(Giddens, 1990, p. 121). 
 
Although Giddens was referring specifically to the mutuality of self-disclosure in 
personalized contexts, such as personal and erotic ties, this mutual self-disclosure process 
seems to apply equally well to establishing trust in any relationship, such as that between a 
company and its stakeholders.9  
 
There has been some recognition in the literature that narrative reporting could help to build 
trust between disclosers and their stakeholders. Indeed, Walker (1998) showed that the 
presentation of accounts by an agent to a principal nurtured trust. Further, Walker (2005) 
showed that in the 19th century accounting was seen by some as a duty of ‘faithful 
stewardship’ and that accounting nurtured trust among stakeholders. He referred to the 
                                                 
9  The applicability of this analogy is discussed in full in Solomon (2005). 
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accounts of Octavia Hill submitted to those who had provided her with charitable donations as 
well as owners of property she managed, 
“Octavia Hill nurtured the trust of property owners and fulfilled her stewardship 
responsibility by the periodic submission of financial accounts and vouchers...” 
(Walker, 2005, p.15). 
 
The risk society theory has also been found to apply to countries outside Europe. Benn (2004) 
used case study evidence to demonstrate the emergence of the risk society in Australia, by 
examining the management of toxic chemicals. She explored the need to manage toxic waste 
effectively as a means of re-establishing public trust within a risk society, full of anxiety and 
mistrust. Trust manifested itself as a primary issue in the toxic waste industry as the poor 
reputation of the government and anxiety relating to dangers arising from waste products 
undermined the credibility of the scientific experts (McDonnell, 1997; Benn, 2004). 
McDonnell (1997) identified poor communication relating to toxic waste risks as central to 
the failure to rebuild trust and that effective communication (although he was not discussing 
the accounting function specifically) was essential in order to pursue credibility.  
 
The need for SER to engender trust among stakeholders, in the sense of ‘credibility’ was 
recognised in the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines and their underlying principles 
(Adams and Evans, 2004). Specifically, the GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (GRI, 
2002) state that, 
“Stakeholders expect to be able to trust an organisation’s sustainability report. To 
benefit from the process of sustainability reporting, organisations themselves also 
want to take steps to enhance the credibility of their reports. This contributes to 
building stakeholder trust and to continual improvement in the quality of reporting 
systems and processes” (GRI, 2002, p.17). 
 
It is this issue of trust which is the focus of the current research. None of the SER literature to 
date has used the risk society discourse as a basis for interpreting SER as a mechanism for 
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reducing risk and societal anxiety, through restoring trust in society. It is in applying this 
strand of the risk society theory that this paper contributes to the theoretical literature in SER. 
Further, the paper provides empirical evidence to support a risk society theory of SER. 
Although Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004a) applied the risk society theory to explaining 
voluntary SER, they focused on a different angle of the theory from the current paper. This 
paper focuses predominantly on the role of building trust as a solution to the problems 
inherent in a risk society. The paper endeavours to provide concrete empirical evidence to 
support the foundations of a risk society theory of voluntary SER. 
 
3. Research Method 
A series of 24 face-to-face interviews was carried out between May and August 2004 with 
SEE representatives in UK companies listed in the FTSE100. The sample was selected in 
order to provide a cross-section of industries. Within each industry, the companies were 
selected randomly. Each interviewee was contacted by telephone and given a brief summary 
of the research agenda before the interview. The interviews all lasted approximately one and a 
half hours, were taped-recorded and later transcribed. Interviewees were assured of 
confidentiality. The majority of interviewees were involved in SEE issues within their 
companies as heads of environmental matters, or CSR directors (see table below). The 
closeness of the interviewees to SEE issues provided a degree of confidence in their ability to 
respond fully to the questions. 
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Interviewee Details 
 
Code Interviewee's Role in Company Industry Sector 
C1 CSR Manager Extractive 
C2 Director, Sustainable Development & Risk Assurance Water 
C3 Sustainab Manager Building and 
Construction 
C4 CSR Man Retail 
C5 Risk Assessor IT 
C6 Group Social Policy Manager Food and Beverages 
C7 Group Company Secretary Building and 
Construction 
C8 Head of E onment. Advises on environmental issu Transport 
C9 Head of E onmental and Health and Safety Perfor ent. Food and Beverages 
C10 Operations Coordinator Pharmaceutical 
C11 Head of E onmental Relations Food Retail 
C12 Internatio nd Government Affairs Adviser Extractive 
C13 EVP Ext  Affairs Extractive 
C14 Group D r with responsibility for Safety, Health t Building and 
Construction 
C15 Company secretary responsible for preparation draftin 's CSR 
component  annual report. 
IT 
C16 Sustainab velopment for group. Water 
C17 Environmental Manager Retail 
C18 Vice President of Social Responsibility Media 
C19 Corporate Responsibility Coordinator Financial Services 
C20 Corporate Responsibility Manager for the group. Energy 
C21 Corporate Responsibility Manager Energy 
C22 Corporate Risk Control Manager Retail 
C23 Risk Controller Supply Chain 
Management 
C24 CSR Man  Retail 
 
General research questions were asked, which wer lightly after each interview, in 
order to incorporate fresh evidence (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The research question 
involved uncovering the philosophical and theoreti vation for SER. Interviewees were 
encouraged to talk broadly about SER and their es’ SEE-related activities. Prior 
methodological research in accounting has st d the strengths of the interview 
methodology for tackling issues of ethical and social responsibility (Parker and Roffey, 1997). 
The interview data were microanalysed to reveal rviews were carried out until 
theoretical sat n was attained, in other words, until no new issues arose (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). The findings of the interviews are summarised in diagrammatic form discussed 
later in the paper. 
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4. Empirical E  
In this section, we examine the interview data, using a grounded theory approach, in order to 
ascertain the extent to which corporate behaviour is sympathetic to a risk theoretical 
framework for voluntary SER. 
 
Reducing Risk and Anxiety by Nurturing Trust: E
Theoretical Framework for Voluntary SER 
When asked what was driving SER, all the intervie d that the main driving force 
involved building and maintaining a reputation. They associated this with developing and 
maintaining trust between themselves and their sta ll the interviewees considered 
that reputation was gained with difficulty over t ould easily be lost. They were 
anxious about losing the trust of their stakeholders. They considered that they needed to build 
trust between themselves and their stakeholders and viewed SER as a mechanism for 
promoting trust. The interviewees discussed the concepts of reputation and trust 
interchangeably, as though they considered they w ous. The strong link between 
putation risk and trust as drivers of SER indicates that SER as an SEA mechanism was seen 
led to corporate reputational issues in the SEE area becoming far more important for business, 
vidence
vidence Supporting the Risk Society 
wees indicate
keholders. A
ime but c
ere synonym
re
by some interviewees as representing a means of restoring trust in a risk society. For example, 
“It’s the reputational issue rather than any other and more importantly, it is about 
the image of the business, you know, not just in the UK, but more broadly.  If you 
ask consumers in the U.K. “Which companies do you trust, do you respect? 
Which companies produce quality products? Which companies look after 
employees, are good neighbours in the community?”... So there’s a long heritage 
of being a well-respected business and seen to be so in the eyes of consumers 
generally.  What’s the value of that?  Well! Probably incalculable” (emphasis 
added) 
 
Linked to building and maintaining trust through reputation, is the contribution of the media 
and the way in which the rapid increase in the quantity, speed and efficiency of the media has 
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“as the world gets smaller, communication gets faster, more invasive, people need 
being driven
to protect their company and understand the company far more.  A lot of it is 
 by reputation, things that may have happened twenty years ago and 
never got reported, or reported only within a single charity or within a single 
group of individuals, now becomes world news overnight, very, very quickly and 
can have a long-term effect on a company’s reputation.” (emphasis added) 
 
ed in the management of toxic waste risks 
 SER could nurture trust among stakeholders 
This q as it 
refers  the 
Overall, our interviewees confirmed Giddens’ view that loss of trust was a crucial issue in 
society for companies and that it needed to be restored. SER was perceived as a solution. 
Indeed, this mirrors the experiences identifi
(McDonnell, 1997; Benn, 2004). 
 
Implicit in the interviewees’ discussion of how
was the notion that such SEE accountability would also reduce anxiety among consumers and 
shareholders. For example, one interviewee discussed how important SER was as a means of 
communicating product safety to consumers, thereby nurturing their trust, 
“virtually everything that we sell in our stores, you either put on your skin, or 
ingest through some orifice or other!  What we want, is for our customers to be 
100% certain about the products that we sell are safe, ’cos if they’re not, you 
know, they’re not going to swallow something if they think there’s the slightest 
doubt. That’s all about the trust and reputation that our customers have in us 
when they shop with us, and that’s why this is all so absolutely crucial to us as a 
business” (emphasis added)   
 
Another interviewee reaffirmed the role of reputation and trust in the SEE area, 
“Reputation is clearly vital to many consumer products, less important probably 
in business-to-business products. You’re talking about a small group of 
companies who may be less sensitive to some of these sorts of ethical, 
environmental and social issues. But I think companies that are very dependent on 
their reputation, as consumer brands, are actually very exposed, we’re there and 
easy to take pot shots at and ultimately dependent on the licensing” (emphasis 
added). 
 
uote also provides some support for legitimacy theory as an explanation for SER, 
 to maintaining the company’s license to operate. These views are reminiscent of
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problems discussed in Giddens (1990; 1991) where trust has to be gained by consumers, in 
particular, because they are not in a position to produce everything for themselves, 
“..a person may go to great lengths to avoid eating certain foods that contain 
additives, but if the individual does not grow everything he or she eats, trust must 
 
This ages 
uch trust to grow among consumers and other stakeholders concerned about a variety of risk-
‘risk communicators’ ... the changes require establishing a structure enabling 
ility change agents and the range of stakeholders” 
(Benn, 2004, p.410). 
Trust
All th ntial 
impac ncial 
perfo ef in a business case motivation for SER. Indeed, the 
business case for SER has been built in recent years on a risk discourse. There has been a 
growing awareness among the business community that SEE risks can materialise into 
signif ain 
reacti ated 
into t ent 
necessarily be invested in the purveyors of ‘natural foods’ to provide superior 
products” (Giddens, 1991, p.23, emphasis added). 
emphasises the need for the corporate community to produce SER which encour
s
related issues. The type of dialogue recommended for the toxic waste industry in Australia 
needs to be incorporated into accounting in the SEE area, as, 
“In the sustainable organisation, sustainability change agents would function as 
dialogue between sustainab
 
These recommendations can easily be applied to SER, if we view the accounting function as 
acting as a ‘change agent’. Rather than a passive, historic activity, there is a need for a SER to 
become a proactive instrument of change in our risk society. 
 
 and Financial Performance: The Philosophy Underlying Voluntary SER 
e companies interviewed also stressed the risk of losing reputation and its conseque
t on financial performance. They made a clear link between SEE risk and fina
rmance, confirming their beli
icant impacts on financial performance. The Turnbull Report (1999) engendered a ch
on in companies by encouraging SEE risks and other non-financial risks to be integr
heir core internal control systems (ACCA, 2000). This involved estimation, managem
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and disclosure of SEE risks. The evidence from the interviews provided overwhelming 
support for a business case motivation underlying SER rather than the aim of enhancing social 
justice. There was little support for a genuinely pure ethics case, or non-instrumental ethics 
case underlying SER. For example, the following company stressed the financially-driven 
opportunities associated with CSR which seemed to outweigh any concern about risks, 
ion and our sales. So whilst we 
take a risk and opportunity approach, we’re definitely looking for the 
opportunities from CSR as well as just managing the risks” (emphasis added). 
the City and shareholders 
that we are operating in an environmentally friendly way and in a sustainable way. 
 
 is interesting that this quotation reinforces the shareholder group as the primary 
rs, the institutional investors. 
lthough this interviewee talks about ‘everybody’ at the end of the quotation, his first 
ement running 
“Historically, companies like [the company] have been able to drive market share 
by things like GM-free and additives- and preservatives-free. You know, these are 
all CSR-related issues that have helped our reputat
 
The following quote emphasises the view from Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004a) that 
companies are keen to convince society that they are benign in the SEE area, 
“Wanting to maintain a reputation, wanting to show 
It’s really demonstrating to everybody that we have the proper systems in place 
and that they are effective” (emphasis added). 
It
stakeholders. This is consistent with predictions of Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004b) that 
where SEA is rooted in self-interest, companies will be most sensitive to the views and 
concerns of their most financially influential stakeholde
A
consideration was given to ‘the City and shareholders’. This is another el
throughout the interviews, which reinforces a business case scenario for SER. 
 
Another interviewee linked reputation with financial gain, but also alluded to encouraging 
‘comfort’ among the stakeholders, which is reminiscent of the creation of a Giddensian 
(1991) protective cocoon, 
 19
“We want to be able to demonstrate to them that we’re managing those issues 
development issues or SEE issues.  We don’t want to become a company which 
surprises, which either cause stake-holders, if they’re financial stake-holders, a 
the company. 
properly.  So that’s why we spend quite a lot of time reporting about sustainable 
acquires a reputation for not having hands on these issues and then is subject to 
financial loss, or if they are non-financial stake-holders, some loss of comfort in 
 
Evidence Supporting a Legitimacy Theoretical Framework for Voluntary SER 
Inherent in the underlying motivation for SER is legitimacy theory, that companies are 
attempting to verify their existence and to maintain their license to operate. For example, 
anoth
nts, 
communities, investors, bankers, are very important to us. I think people talk in 
terms of brand. Some of my colleagues in this country find it difficult to think in 
 
However, the need to legitimise actions is intertwined with the need to maintain reputation 
and b nd’. 
Furth e company’s impact in the SEE area is 
benign, Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2004a) is a necessary element in creating an atmosphere of 
trust between companies and their stakeholders. Therefore, creating and disseminating a green 
myth through SER is a means of building up trust and reputation and reducing risk and 
anxiety in a risk society paradigm.  
 
er interviewee commented that, 
“We are also very exposed and dependent on licenses to operate, and access to 
resources, so the value of relationships, whether it be with governme
those terms” (emphasis added). 
uild trust. In the case of this interviewee, this is evident in his reference to ‘bra
er, the ‘green’ myth (creating a myth that th
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Evidence Supporting a Stakeholder Theoretical Framework for Voluntary SER 
The interviews also indicated that SER was motivated by a stakeholder demand for SEE 
information and that the companies wanted to encourage and develop a genuine dialogue with 
their rust, 
to red tive, 
there ver, 
be sure of the reason for this demand and whether the stakeholders were thought to require the 
SEE information for decision-making (for example buying shares or purchasing the 
company’s products) or for accountability reasons. However, the general impression from the 
interviewees was that the demand for SER was being driven by decision-usefulness. 
Consumers require information on product safety, as seen earlier. Shareholders require 
information on SEE issues because of the potential impact of SEE risks on share price. 
Empl . If 
SER ogic 
omponent seems essential. As stressed in Thomson and Bebbington (2004), SER needs to 
especially on disclosure. The reason why we have that social report now, is that a 
non-financial report” (emphasis added). 
ocess of mutual self-disclosure, raised by Giddens (1990) 
s a means of nurturing trust in relationships, as the stakeholders are disclosing their needs, 
which are being met through the SER process. This aspect of SER emerged poignantly from 
the following interview, 
stakeholders on SEE issues. Again, this was also linked closely to the need to build t
uce anxiety, and to maintain a license to operate. However, from a markets perspec
was a perception of a strong demand for SER from stakeholders. We cannot, howe
oyees require SEE information to inform their feeling of security within the company
is going to engender a rebuilding of trust and a reduction in risk and anxiety, the dial
c
become dialogical in order to fulfil its accountability potential. By responding to the needs of 
stakeholders, SER is likely to become genuinely more dialogical. There is a clear demand 
arising from stakeholders as, 
“On social issues, the stakeholders actually want to know more from us and 
lot of people ask a lot of questions and it’s a simple way of answering them in a 
 
This is an ideal illustration of the pr
a
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“As part of the processes behind that (SER), there’s very much a ‘listening and 
learning’ aspect to it, so they have to have regular engagement with local 
expectations are of the company. Some of those expectations may be, for 
the community about how well the company is doing environmentally.  So that’s a 
 
Such mutual self-disclosure contributes to building and maintaining trust through the 
establishment of a genuinely dialogical form of SER. As we saw earlier, companies perceive 
financial reward from enhanced reputation and trust. There was also some indication that our 
interviewees viewed SER as a means of enhancing social justice, 
“We believe it’s the right thing to do. Our stakeholders are seeking for us to be 
(emphasis added). 
s as ways of viewing SER. However, the interview evidence has 
provi g of 
trust  the 
ndings of this research that the risk society theory appears to dominate. Further, it is possible 
the risk society theoretical framework can be used as an overarching 
communities to listen to what their concerns are, what their needs are, what their 
example, on the level of environmental reporting, what information they want in 
big driver for us” (emphasis added) 
more open and honest and transparent, and we’re seeking to meet those needs” 
 
However, this is one of only two references from our interviews to suggest that there is a 
genuine ethical motivation driving SER. 
 
The Risk Society Theoretical Framework as a Theoretical Umbrella Encapsulating Previous 
Theories of Voluntary SER 
From a series of interviews, the paper provides empirical evidence to support the stakeholder 
and legitimacy theoretical len
ded strong support for the risk society theoretical framework, based on the nurturin
relationships between companies and their stakeholders. Indeed, it seems from
fi
to suggest that the risk society theory encapsulates previous theories. No one theoretical 
framework is sufficient to view voluntary SER clearly. The ‘new’ risk society theoretical 
framework is, similarly, insufficient in itself. However, if we analyse the findings of this 
research we can see that 
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lens t tical 
frame
 
Firstl agement tool, used strategically by companies to 
reduce societal anxiety about corporate impacts on the environment and society. This is an 
important finding, as it implies that the production of SER is an important corporate 
governance mechanism within a company’s system of internal control for reducing a 
company’s risk profile through management of reputation and manipulation of stakeholders’ 
perspectives. 
 
econdly, the development of a dialogical communication between companies via SER 
, the risk society theoretical framework subsumes 
takeholder theory as an explanation for voluntary SER. Indeed, a recent report from the 
 to the emerging process of stakeholder engagement, any attempt 
reducing reputation risk” (ICAEW, 2004, p.29). 
its role in society and generate a new license to operate” (ICAEW, 2004, p.31). 
hrough which to view the motives for voluntary SER, incorporating earlier theore
works. 
y, SER may be seen as a risk man
S
represents a further means of nurturing trusting relations, thereby reducing anxiety and 
societal perceptions of risk. In this way
s
ICAEW (2004) discussed the importance of nurturing dialogue with stakeholders. Although 
the report referred primarily
to develop dialogical SER (in the manner defined by Thomson and Bebbington, 2004) 
represents part of the stakeholder engagement and dialogue. The ICAEW report drew a clear 
connection between dialogue with stakeholders and risk reduction. Specifically, the report 
focused on, 
“...the increasing significance attached to engagement with stakeholders in 
 
Further, improved communication with stakeholders is considered not only risk reducing but 
is also linked to legitimacy theory, 
“By engaging with stakeholders, the company believed that it was able to redefine 
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This is evidence that perceptions of SER are linked to risk reduction, such that a risk theory of 
SER encapsulates legitimacy and stakeholder theories. 
 
Thirdly, SER reduces risk and therefore helps companies to be perceived as ‘green’ and 
‘friendly’ by society. In this way society will be encouraged to provide the necessary license 
to operate. In this way, the risk society theoretical framework subsumes legitimacy theory as 
an explanation for voluntary SER. Figure 1 derives from the findings of this research. 
 
5. Concluding Discussion and Theoretical Implications 
build and to maintain trust (through the language of reputation) among their 
stakeh ism 
roug
vation for SER were a number of other characteristics 
theori pect 
of anxiety, prevalent 
The paper reports the findings of 24 interviews with CSR managers from the FTSE100 on the 
motivation for SER. The findings contribute to the existing SER literature on a number of 
levels. Firstly, on a theoretical level, the paper illuminates the theoretical framework which 
was supported by the empirical evidence. As well as the acknowledged theoretical motives for 
SER, the paper aimed to examine the extent to which the more recent risk society theory 
provided a theoretical lens through which the ongoing development of SER may be viewed. 
Specifically, it investigated whether or not the concept of building trust as a means of risk 
management in a risk society could be applied to explaining SER. Our findings provided 
strong support for this paradigm, with interviewees confirming that they were producing SER 
in order to 
olders. Indeed, SER was considered to represent a risk management mechan
h a risk society theoretical lens. th
 
Linked to this aspect of the moti
sed in the risk society paradigm, which were confirmed by our interviewees. The as
in the theoretical sociological work on the risk society (Beck, 1999, 
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Giddens, 1990; 1991), was a cause for concern among interviewees, especially in relation to 
the need for establishing trust in an environment of anxiety and mistrust such as that 
surrounding consumer products. SER was seen to provide a mechanism for reducing levels of 
anxiety among consumers and other stakeholders, when viewed through a risk society 
theoretical lens. 
 
The interviews also provided support for other theoretical frameworks which may be applied 
to SER. Legitimacy theory received empirical support, as interviewees stressed the need to 
retain their license to operate and the role that SER could play in achieving this aim. We also 
found some support from the interviewees for stakeholder theory, as the companies were 
aware of a strong demand for SER from stakeholders. Their desire to create dialogue with 
their stakeholders through the SER mechanism was reminiscent of theories which seek to 
explain a need to achieve dialogical SER (Thomson and Bebbington, 2004). Dialogical SER 
needs to be encouraged if companies are to discharge SEE accountability to their 
stakeholders. This again links back to the risk society framework, as dialogue (mutual self-
disclosure in Giddens’ terms) is a means of building trust. By building trust through 
stakeholder dialogue via the SER mechanism, companies can reduce risk. In the figure below, 
we draw together the various theoretical strands which appear to be most appropriate for 
analysing and explaining SER, from our empirical evidence. 
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A second contribution of the paper is in the confirmation from our interviewees that SER is 
risk-driven, to a large extent. It is the risk aspect of SEE issues which is forcing companies to 
focus on disclosing SEE information via the SER mechanism. Within a Turnbull (1999) 
framework, SER is a means of informing stakeholders of the results of the internal control 
and risk management processes. However, as we can see from the above theoretical 
ation, trust is established and this results in a form of 
start to be more transparent and 
another viewpoint may be that the trust 
interpretation of SER is simply evidence of managerial capture, as companies are using SER 
to create a more favourable image of their activities to stakeholders in order to nurture trust, 
thereby ‘capturing’ SER for their own benefit. 
 
discussion, by disclosing this inform
SEE risk management per se. From this perspective, SER can be seen as an important aspect 
of a company’s internal control system, as it helps to improve a company’s risk profile by 
manipulating stakeholder perceptions of the company’s SEE risks. 
 
Thirdly, the paper examines SER as a mechanism for enhancing social justice, or for simply 
driving financial performance. The majority of our interview evidence supported the business 
case rather than the social justice case for SER. This business case scenario was found to be 
linked to the establishment of a ‘green myth’, with companies struggling to portray an image 
that they were actively pursuing CSR and that this was also a profitable route for the 
company to follow. The creation of a green myth may be interpreted within a risk society 
framework as a means of portraying ‘truth’ and thereby communicating with stakeholders 
about genuine issues. As Beck (1999) explained, mistrust needs to be disintegrated as 
companies within a risk society stop acting as polluters and 
accountable to their stakeholders. However, 
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The risk society discourse offers an alternative view of SER. However, it may offer more 
than that. Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004a) felt that Beck was offering the potential to provide 
a powerful framework to describe SER. This paper shows that the risk society discourse not 
only provides a powerful competing theory to explain the motivations for SER but may also 
represent a theory which encapsulates previous theories of voluntary SER under one 
theoretical umbrella. The interview evidence suggests that one theory per se is not adequate 
to explain voluntary SER. Indeed, instead of using one lens to view SER, it seems more 
appropriate to view SER using a collection of lenses. Different facets of a prism allow the 
viewer to perceive a clearer image of the motivations underlying voluntary SER. Further 
search is required to investigate the extent to which the risk society theory is indeed re
powerful enough to incorporate previous theories of voluntary SER in contemporary society. 
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